idealism, and opposed to the idea of natural law-had been profoundly altered. 3 The crisis of idealism showed itself in the dispersion of its old adherents in various contradictory directions, among them that of Catholic spiritualism* linked with the fortunes of political Catholicism which seemed to many the surest defense against the menace of communism. This Catholic trend, without declaring itself on the side of Thomistic positions and without therefore embracing the official Catholic doctrine of natural law, could not (because of the central position in its philosophy of the concept of person and because of its links with the thought of Antonio Rosmini, during the last century one of the most positive proponents of natural law) fail to be sympathetic with this rebirth of the idea of natural law, in spite of the historical scruples of some of its representatives.
In addition, the renascence of Catholic thought strengthened and spread Neo-Thomism, which had kept alive the Catholic tradition of natural law, even though there are rare signs of it in the prewar period; and in fact Giorgio Del Vecchio began to draw nearer to Thomistic philosophy while yet remaining faithful to the original Neo-Kantian basis of his thought. It was Del Vecchio who had, at the beginning of the century, in the era of dominant positivism, defended the universal value of natural law and to whom as early as 1934 Pope Pius XI had written, through the then Cardinal Pacelli, that in his books he pointed out "substantial elements of that philosophia perennis which ... is satisfied by the nourishment of the eternal wisdom." 4 In fact, in the purely philosophical field, in which Catholic spiritualism is accompanied by other active and efficacious currents of thought, from existentialism to Marxism and logical neo-positivism, which now seems in great vogue among youth-currents which all criticize and refute the idea of natural lawthis idea appears to arouse less favor than among the jurists: they in turn were in the past no less bitter critics of natural law because of the almost complete domination among them of juridical positivism. The most eloquent proof of this renewed interest on the part of many Italian jurists in natural law can be found by running through the indices of the two officially Catholic law reviews: ]us, of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, and lustitia, of the Union of Italian Catholic Jurists. Jus frequently prints articles dedicated to natural law; and Justitia, in its first number (1948) , opened a discussion of the "basic problem" which faces the conscience of the Catholic jurist when confronted with a law which may not conform to the principles of his faith. Numerous articles on this point anticipated the exhortation made by the Pope to Catholic jurists to examine thoroughly the problem of the conduct of the jurist in regard to unjust laws.
In a discourse directed to the delegates to the first Congress of the Union of Catholic Jurists, on November 5, 1949, Pius XII drew attention to "the unsolved contrasts between the noble concept of man and law according to Christian principles... and juridical positivism," pointing out the conflict of conscience which arises for the Catholic jurist "who strives to keep faith with the Christian concept of law... particularly when he is in the position of having to apply a law which his own conscience condemns as unjust"; but already in the Encyclical Summi Pontificatus (1939) and in the Christmas radio address of 1942 the Pontiff had reaffirmed the eternal validity of natural law, and the Italian Catholic jurists were at that time already turning toward its re-evaluation. Since 1947 one writer has strongly vindicated the juridical quality of natural law, a quality which he on the other hand denied to the laws whose content was opposed to it;5 and another writer has devoted an entire volume to the problem of the unjust law. 6 Meanwhile, in the review lustitia, the discussion of the same problem was growing intense. This then formed the focal point of the "workshop" held near Varese in June, 1949, by the Union of Catholic Jurists on the theme Effective Natural Law, a theme which expressed with polemic evidence a clear-cut point of view.
Both the conclusions of the delegates to the workshop and the writings which appeared from 1948 to 1951 on this point in lustitia, along with the text of the Pope's speech and the article of Del Vecchio mentioned above which serves as an introduction, were collected in a volume published in Rome in 1951 which has as its title the theme of the workshop, Effective Natural Law. This is rather useful for anyone who wishes to form an idea of the opinions of the Italian Catholic jurists on this question; it is useful even if the impression which emerges 5. Domenico Barbero, in the work Dxnrrro E STATO (Milan 1947) , then condensed as an . 1952) , and some-from it is, to use the words of one of the most authoritative participants in the meeting, that among the delegates there exists, in regard to the effectiveness of natural law, "a remarkably surprising disparity of points of view,"s and (once again having recourse to the words of another participant in the discussion, the Jesuit Father Lener 9 ) "a profound disorientation" caused by the conflict which is held to be ineluctable between the asserted truth of natural law and the dogmatic principles and practical exigencies of positive jurisprudence. Of the 21 Italian jurists whose opinion is reported in the volume, 1 0 certainly not all and indeed not many accept what ought to be, according to the title of the volume, the thesis of all of the contributors: that natural law has a vitality of its own, above and beyond law imposed by the State. It would take too long to give here the individual theses, even in the form of syntheses; but certainly while manifestly everyone feels the problem of the duty of the conscience confronted with unjust law to be "a basic problem" (this was the title of the article which first appeared anonymously but in fact written by Santoro Passarelli, which began the discussion in lustitia), it is equally evident that almost all are aware of the danger that would be imminent in basing the principle of verifiability by the citizen of the legitimacy of the laws of the State, with the consequent renunciation of what, at least in continental European countries, is considered an essential requisite of law, its certitude.
And it is significant that, among those who show themselves most troubled abcut accepting the radical solution of the full effectiveness of natural law, there are a philosopher, a constitutionalist trained in philosophy, and a historian: Giuseppe Capograssi, Carlo Esposito, and Ugo Nicolini, who, better than the jurists themselves, could, although for different reasons, see with great profundity into a problem whose terms seem simple but which excludes any simple solutions (which are, however, not lacking in the volume). Nicolini, in particular, who in several works1l examined the problem of the unjust law historically, has more concretely and indeed with more historical sense taken up a problem which easily leads to anti-historical solutions.
Effective Natural Law, in short, rather than proposing a solution, defines in all its complexity a problem which remains unsolved; and this is so The same uncertainties arise to perplex those who see the matter from the opposite point of view, who, convinced of the necessity first of all of the certitude of law and therefore of the bond between the judge and the rule of positive organization, cannot deny the difficulties which that concept implies and who would like to find a way to reconcile the antithetical requirements of certitude and of the justice of the law. 13 Taking part in the debate which developed in lustitia was Francesco Camelutti, a Catholic jurist, Honorary President of the Union of Catholic Jurists and the most widely known of Italian jurists. But his article, 14 even though it recognizes the "basic problem," did not seem to try to identify the problem with that of the conflict between positive law and natural law. This conflict was, according to him, rather between law and fact, since law by its nature never perfectly equals fact, which can always be presented as an exception in relation to any law whatsoever: a profound and undeniable truth, the discussion of which, however, avoided the matter of the problem which the promoters of the debate had intended to impose on it. And in truth Carnelutti, although he is most Catholic (besides his very many famous works on jurisprudence, he has also written a Meditation on the Ave Maria, an Interpretation of the Pater Noster, and Glosses on Matthew's Gospel), has only recently and with some uncertainty and reservation been disposed to accept what is indeed a main point in official Catholic philosophical-juridical thought: belief in natural law. As late as 1939, in the volume Metodologia del Diritto,z 5 and more decisively in an article with the almost irreverent title Natural Law? 16 he had denied on logical grounds that there could be any law other than positive, since what stands above the law could not be law. Nevertheless, in the same pages of the Metodologia in which the concept of natural law was attributed to an unpardonable misunderstanding, he spoke of ethical laws which stand above the law and of "rules which the lawmaker must observe .. .laws which are the highest and the most difficult to grasp and in connection with which it is understood how nature which establishes them can be nothing but a divine order." But Camelutti too must have been attracted by that dialectic of ideas which leads those who approach or return to Catholicism, for extra-philosophical or irrational reasons, to embrace its entire philosophy little by little, even if reluctantly at first. It was precisely while praising St. Thomas Aquinas that Carnelutti, thanking God for having permitted him to move beyond the convictions expressed in the Metodologia, declared that the law is "truly natural" in that it is born of morality, and that natural law "is such all the more because it is revealed to the conscious- ness of man as an ethical, supernatural and infinite principle."I 7
The echo of the famous words of St. Thomas is evident. But an explicit "conversion" on properly juridical grounds did not take place until 1951 when, with an article which caused considerable comment, he came to speak of a "complex of rules which appear to be born in the world of the spirit just as plants are born in the world of nature," defining this complex expressly as "natural law" and pointing out in various aspects of juridical life the proof of the insufficiency of positive law.1S Some uncertainty and some reservations persist, but the immanent logic of the Catholic position forces the jurist to accept natural law. Although regarding it as no less "pharisaical" than positive law and foreseeing the end of both of them since they are both morally deficient, he is henceforth convinced that "if it does not conform to natural law, positive law cannot function."19 I have dwelt at some length on the case of Carnelutti both because of the authoritative position he enjoys in the field of Italian judicial studies and the impression which the evolution of his thought has made, and because this evolution is characteristic of a large part of Italian culture other than in judicial matters and even .in the political life of Italy. In politics there are now diffused and becoming increasingly dominant in common thought ideas such as that of natural law, of Catholic origin, which have inadvertently worked their way into surroundings at the outset indifferent and hostile. These ideas are accepted today perhaps without full awareness of the scope of such an acceptance, the nature of which is extrinsic and contingent.
Thus, even if the number of volumes devoted specifically to natural law is small, 2 0 anyone who leafs through the Italian juridical reviews, the collections of studies in honor of this or that master, or the acts of congresses and conventions, frequently comes across articles having natural law as their theme. Most of these articles are favorable to natural law and welcome with satisfaction its renaissance, although the subject seemed as recently as fifteen or twenty years ago to be buried forever among the memories of a remote past. In addition to some works which consider natural law objectively in one of its special aspects 2 2 or which appraise its prospects in the framework of the direction of contemporary thought, 2 3 we must now take note of the critics, the adversaries of the renewed natural law movement. Strange as it may seem, they are not found principally among the numerous idealists to whose thought historicity is essential. Confronted by the phenomenon of the rebirth and the new success of natural law these latter have been silent up to now; and some of them, by their adherence to Catholic spiritualism have even been led to the threshold of natural law by that inexorable dialectic of ideas, which, in the realm of Christian philosophy, carries one inevitably if unwittingly from Augustinian positions, which are easily accessible to idealists "of the right," to Thomistic positions. There is, for instance, the case of one of the best and most authoritative representatives of Catholic spiritualism, Felice Battaglia, who in the past was not led by the idealistic and historical origin of his thought to consider sympathetically the idea of natural law, and who recently wrote words which express without question the need for receptivity to values which in law transcend those imposed by the simple fact of the positivity of the law, maintaining that the law, which is "*ussum in -its original aims wants to be justum at the peak of its conscious function, in the aggregate goals of life." 24 Still the positivists persist in opposing natural, law: both those of the old school who have survived the violent assaults which idealism had carried out against their positions in the past, and the followers of logical neo-positivism, many of whom turn their attention to juridical problems examined in the light of analytical philosophy. A representative of the positivism which we might call classical in its criticism of the new doctrine of natural law, is an old and illustrious legal philosopher, Alessandro Groppali, 2 5 who vigorously ascribes to positive law alone the character of juridicity (he, too, pointing out in this respect the uncertainty and perplexity mentioned by the Catholic jurists), and fears that the Catholic thesis of the illegitimacy of laws contrary to natural law may be pushed so far as to want to give to the Constitutional Court the power to verify the conformity of the laws, not only to the written constitution, but also to the natural law. These ideas, even though he does not say so, have been proposed indeed by some writers 26 on the rather questionable presupposition that 22 . In its relation to canon law the following study it, but from different points of view:
Giuseppe Olivero, the Constitution, having accepted certain principles of natural law, meant to accept the whole doctrine. On the political plane also these ideas present grave difficulties because placing an ulterior order of values above that expressed in the written constitution would open the way for analogous demands on the part of supporters of other ideologies maintaining a different concept of justice. This is a tendency which has already been apparent in several politicians, who claim that the concept of constitutionality is not to be understood as purely juridical. Different in its arguments but analogous in substance is the criticism which Norberto Bobbio, one of the most authoritative philosophers, applies to the doctrine of natural law. Taking his cue from the recent Italian translation of a volume by d'Entr~ves, Natural Law, written originally in English, and from the publication of other English works on natural law, Bobbio has shrewdly discussed the legitimacy of such a law, 27 bringing out clearly that to the exigency of an objective ethic affirmed by the natural law proponents, there simply never is a corresponding formulation of indisputable maxims of conduct, universally valid, which do not succumb to any historical change.
But it is not for this reason that the adversaries of natural law fail to appreciate the demand, expressed by the natural law philosophers in a radical form, for an ideal of justice above the law which is effective from the mere fact that it is in civitate posita: the favor which the "institution" theory enjoys among many jurists and philosophers does not cause the attribution of the character of juridicity to laws diverse from those of the State to encounter grave obstacles, and therefore it does not cause one to consider scandalous the thesis of a juridical provision not only not ordered by the State but superior to the State. This is so even though there is no admission necessarily of a juridical order which is universally and absolutely valid, an idea repugnant to the historical approach which has inspired much of Italian culture.
Even more appreciated is the demand, both political and moral, that legislators and the State in general respect the essential rights of the person, even if these latter are understood on a historical rather than rationalistic or naturalistic level, and even if their positive formulation is required in order to accept their juridical character and force. As will now be more clearly seen, this is what Groppali does; likewise Scarpelli, a young magistrate who follows the analytical philosophers and is close to the thought of Bobbio; and Bobbio himself does not deny entirely the need for a criterion of evaluation for historical law, provided that this criterion does not assume the form of an absolute or purely rational idea. Catholics and others, natural law proponents and historical or positivist thinkers are moreover all agreed, though moving from diverse premises, in affirming the necessity of respect for the fundamental rights of man. They are on this point opposed to the spokesmen of totalitarian states. In 1946, when the assembly which was to give Italy its new republican constitution began its work, the Jesuit Father Messineo declared that the original rights, borne by the person in his own free and spiritual being and never to be violated even by constitutional and Father Messineo had already written on this last work. Also published in 1950 is a fuller study of a similar nature, the volume by Massimo Curcio, La Dichiarazione dei Diritti delle Nazioni Unite, 3 6 as well as an essay by Giovanni Ambrosetti,37 which attempts to find the link between the rights of man and the historical concepts in which they must be rooted. In 1951 we find a work by Arturo Carlo Jemolo, a jurist and a rather well-known historian, foreseeing the foundation of human rights in the conscience of the people and in custom. We find also a lecture by Bobbio to the students of the Turin Military School 39 and finally an article by Groppali, 4 0 which affirms, in conformity with his positivist convictions, the necessity for even the fundamental rights of man to be positively recognized by the juridical structure because they can be made to have value. But he certainly does not deny their character of "natural and primary exigencies" which in a certain sense force the State to recognize them. It is therefore not in the name of the omnipotence of the State-or even simply of the absolute pre-eminence of the rules imposed by the State over any other rules whatever-that the jurists and philosophers who deny natural law 29. 1 Limiti del Potere Costituente, 97 LA CVIvLTX CATTOLICA 400-09 (I 1946). intend to limit the nature of juridicity to positive rules alone. The dangers of identifying the State with absolute value are, because of bitter direct experience, present to all Italians to such a degree that, as has leen seen, not even the idealists of Gentile's school are opposed to the rebirth of natural law, though their doctrine could indeed once again lead them to such an opposition. Nor do the positivists, both old and young, mean to deny the aspiration of men to a set of laws better than the positivistically effective one; they do not exclude the possibility of an evaluation of these laws on the basis of a higher justice. The leader of Italian positivism himself, Roberto Ardig6, spoke moreover of "social idealities," born of the very psychology of society and destined to work on the evolution of ethical and juridical rules. Even less do these writers doubt the necessity of respect for the basic rights of man even when they are conceived as historically determined. What prevents the admitting of a natural law which is effective above and beyond positive legislation is the necessity of not giving up the certitude of the law and of freeing the application of the law from any subjective evaluation-an obvious source of error and arbitrariness that might alloi, abuses no less serious than those committed by the totalitarian states. This necessity is somewhat more strongly felt in the countries of continental Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon areas where the juridical conscience of the citizens has by long tradition been prepared for the great scope of the powers of the judge. Besides-and here the problem clearly reveals the political and ideological character which is at its base-the Catholic belief in the identity of natural with divine law, and even more with the interpretation of divine law given by the Church of Rome, arouses in non-Catholic jurists and philosophers an understandable reaction to the political developments which that identification may lead to, particularly in a land like Italy, where the problem of the relationship between State and Church is today even more delicate than ever because of the new position to which Catholic political forces have been carried by the fact that in them is recognized the only effective opponent to communism when it loomed before most Italians as a huge menace. Beyond the considerations of a philosophic nature concerning the validity of the doctrine of natural law on the speculative plane, and beyond the considerations of a juridical nature concerning the value of the certitude of the law-what often determines in the last analysis the taking of a position for or against natural law is the fact that the natural law doctrine reborn today is Catholic and its acceptance or its denial implies, potentially at least, certain political consequences.
CoNsmzRAZIONx SuLLz DICHLARAZiON DEi Dmamx (Milan 1947).

La Protezionse Internazionale dei
While there have been no recent studies specifically on natural law in ancient thought, the interest taken by Italian juridico-philosophical thought in recent years in the problem of natural law shows itself also in numerous historical studies which have as their object the doctrine of natural law either in its medieval forms or in those of modern times. To give an account here of all the works of this type which have directly or indirectly to do with natural law is certainly impossible; nor is it possible in any way to give much more than a list of the main studies on the subject. But these notes may give an idea of the fervor of the historical studies which the subject has led to.
There are several causes for this flowering of research, from the constantly On these and other authors there has been a rich harvest of critical studies, of different forms and naturally of varying quality, but all attesting a renewed interest in the matter. The figure of Grotius has aroused particular interest. Studied in all the aspects of his complex personality by Antonio Corsano, who devoted a large volume to him, 4 8 Grotius has been the subject of many individual studies, above all in regard to the connection between his doctrine and Scholasticism and the relationship in his thought between rationalism and history. 57 all discussing the concepts of the doctrine among the canonists and glossators. The first influences of Christian theories of natural law on Roman law were studied by Biondo Biondi,5s one of the most active proponents of the perennial validity of the former. On the doctrine of natural law in St. Thomas there remains to be mentioned an article by Giuseppe Graneris, 5 9 another of the writers whom we have seen to be engaged in the debate among Catholic jurists on the subject of the actual effectiveness of natural law.
For readers of English there has already been noted above one of the principal Italian historical works on natural law, Natural Law, by A. P. d'Entr~ves, which, although it was written in English originally, has now appeared in an Italian version;60 I shall not, however, dwell long on this work, which deserves a special study. The volume by d'Entrives is in any case the only historical study on natural law of a general nature which has appeared in the last few years in Italy, if one leaves aside the historical portion of the book by Biavaschi already mentioned (adequate but of doubtful value), and of the university course of Bobbio which has been published in mimeographed form under the title II Diritto Naturale nel Secolo XVIII.61 To the numerous monographs should be added a short but discerning article by Del Vecchio on contractualism 6 2 and one by Bobbio devoted to Hobbes, 6 3 the book of F. Magliano on the juri-
